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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
VERBERY ADAMS, : Case No. 20090793-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Attempted 
Murder With Injury, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203(2)(a) (2008), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable William Barrett, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(i) (2008). See Addendum A (Sentence, 
Judgment, Conviction). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the prior 
bad act evidence where the State's Rule 404(b) notice was rendered inoperable by the 
introduction of the evidence during the State's case-in-chief in contradiction of the 
prosecution's stated intention as contained in its Rule 404(b) notice. 
Standard of Review: Challenges to evidence rulings under Utah Rule of Evidence 
404(b) are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ^ 
16, 6 P.3d 1120. In so doing, this Court will "review the record to determine whether the 
admission of other bad acts evidence was scrupulously examined by the [district] judge in 
the proper exercise of that discretion." Id. 
Preservation: Defense counsel opposed the admission of Adams' prior conviction 
at R. 85:208. Alternatively, this issue is raised under the plain error doctrine. The plain 
error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error occurred which 
prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness prong may be 
relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in hindsight than 
it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), 
cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Issue II: Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence offered under Utah 
Rules of Evidence 404(b) concerning a prior conviction for murder that occurred fourteen 
years earlier and has no logical connection to the present case. 
Standard of Review: Challenges to evidence rulings under Utah Rule of Evidence 
404(b) are reviewed for abuse of discretion State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, *|j 16, 
6 P.3d 1120. In so doing, this Court will "review the record to determine whether the 
admission of other bad acts evidence was scrupulously examined by the [district] judge in 
the proper exercise of that discretion." Id. 
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Preservation: Defense counsel opposed the admission of Adams' prior conviction due to 
the fact that it was highly prejudicial and not probative of a proper non-character purpose 
pursuant to Rule 404(b). R. 85:5-7. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Evidence 403 and 404 are attached as Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 7, 2008, Adams was charged by information with one count of 
Attempted Murder With Injury, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203(2)(a) (2008) and one count of Attempted Murder, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2008). R. 1-3. Adams was bound over for trial 
following a preliminary hearing. R. 21-2. 
On August 15, 2008, Adams requested that the State provide pretrial notice of 
"evidence of all other crimes, wrongs, or acts of any person, and the purposes of such 
evidence, the State intends to offer at trial, pursuant to Evidence Rule 404(b)." R. 12. The 
prosecution's Notice of Intent to Offer Evidence Under Rule 404(b) was filed on June 10, 
2009. R. 40. Specifically, the Rule 404(b) Notice stated the following, 
The State intends to introduce Defendant's 1995 Murder conviction in the 
State of Illinois (Exhibit A) in order to establish knowledge, intent, and 
absence of mistake or accident in the event that Defendant testifies at the 
trial and puts his knowledge or intent at issue. Defendant, on October 4, 
2008, informed Detective David Greco of West Valley Police department 
that, in 1995, he was convicted of Murder in Chicago for killing someone 
with a car. 
R.40. 
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The prosecution argued its previously filed motion to admit Adams' prior 
conviction pursuant to Rule 404(b) during pre-trial arguments. R. 85:4-8. The State's 
attorney acknowledged that the conviction was more than ten years old, and argued that it 
should nevertheless be admissible to show knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake or 
accident. R. 85:4-8. The State's attorney said, "[I]t is relevant because the issue here 
we're trying to decide today is if the defendant intentionally ran over those two people. 
And so that does go directly into the issue here for this prior conviction because that's 
what he did back in [1994]." Id. Defense counsel argued against admissibility on the 
grounds that the prior conviction was too prejudicial and not probative of intent. R. 85:4-
7. The trial court ruled in favor of admissibility. R. 85:8. 
At trial, the prior conviction was admitted into evidence during the prosecution's 
case-in-chief rather than "in the event that Defendant testifies" as originally requested by 
the State. On direct examination, prosecution witness David Greco, stated that "[Adams] 
then mentioned that he had a previous incident back in 1995 where he had hit someone." 
R. 85:208. Defense counsel objected to the testimony stating, "Judge, I object to this. I 
think that the State has other methods of introducing this. This is hearsay." Id. Defense 
counsel's objection was overruled and the prosecution introduced State's Exhibit 5, the 
certified statement of conviction from Illinois. Id.; State's Exhibit 5. The trial court 
allowed the evidence telling defense counsel, "I'm going to overrule your objection. I've 
already told [the State's attorney] that I will allow Exhibit 5. So it will be received." R. 
85:209. Adams did not testify at trial. 
:
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In closing, the State's attorney stated, "And with the fact that he was convicted of 
killing some guy by car in Chicago 15 years ago, 14 years ago, car is just the preferred 
weapon of the man." R. 85: 231. At the conclusion of a one day bench trial, Adams was 
found guilty of Attempted Murder With Injury, and the Attempted Murder charge was 
dismissed. R. 85. On September 8, 2009, Adams was sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than three years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. R. 71. A 
Notice of Appeal was filed on September 23, 2009. R. 75. Adams is incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of October 4, 2008, a party was taking place at Ula 
Semeli's apartment located in the Shadowbrook apartment complex. R. 85:22. Allan 
Saena, Semeli's cousin, testified that he saw Adams on the sidewalk outside of the 
apartment building, talking to "one of [his] girls," who was on the balcony of Semeli's 
second-story apartment. R. 85:161. Allan Saena approached Adams and words were 
exchanged. Id. Allan Saena, who was intoxicated at the time, punched Adams and a fight 
ensued on the grass outside of the building. R. 85:163, 171. The people from party heard 
the fight and came outside. R. 85:163. According to Allan Saena'a testimony, the 
females from the party tried to hold him back while the males from the party "tried to 
jump [Adams]." Id. Allan Saena testified that there were about six or seven guys 
involved in the beating. Id. Eventually, the fight was broken up and Adams was able to 
runaway. R. 85:164. 
While Adams was attempting to flee in his car, Gary Saena, Allan Saena's cousin, 
was walking across the road in front of the apartment building. Id. Adams clipped Gary 
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Saena with his car causing him to roll over the hood of the car and land on his feet. R. 
85:51. Gary Saena testified that he then "took off running after the car5' along with his 
cousin, Ben, and his fiance, Jennifer Tafi. R. 85:671. Upon seeing this, Allan Saena ran 
in front of Adams' car and began pounding on the hood trying to make him stop, and was 
subsequently run over by the car. R. 85:165. 
Adams circled around the apartment building and drove past the party a second 
time looking for his girlfriend. R. 85:211. Gary Saena, who admitted to drinking three or 
four beers that night, and Jennifer Tafi testified that, when Adams drove by the second 
time, he ran over Allan Saena legs. R. 85: 30, 92, 95. 
Mike Salisbury, the security guard on duty the night of the incident, was following 
Adams in his car when he drove past the party the second time. R. 85:143. Salisbury 
testified that he did not see Adams' car run over anyone. R. 85:143, 148. Salisbury 
maintained that, as he drove past the spot where Allan Saena was allegedly run over for 
the second time, he was three or four feet behind Adams and there was no one in the 
road. R. 85:143, 148, 150. 
Adams left the scene prior to the arrival of the police. R. 85:145. He contacted the 
police the next day and was ultimately was charged with one count of attempted murder, 
a second degree felony, for hitting Gary Saena and one count of attempted murder with 
injury, a first degree felony, for hitting Allan Saena. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rule 404(b)'s notice provision requires that the prosecution give pretrial notice to 
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the defense of any prior bad act evidence that it intends to introduce at trial. In the 
absence of such notice, prior bad act evidence is inadmissible. 
Here, the State notified the defense of its intent to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence 
conditionally upon Adams testifying. Specifically, the prosecution notified Adams of its 
intent to introduce his fourteen year-old prior murder conviction only in the event that he 
testified at trial and put his intent at issue. Adams did not testify. In contradiction of its 
stated intention, the prosecution introduced the 404(b) evidence during its case-in-chief, 
effectively rendering the Rule 404(b) notice to the defense inoperable. 
The prosecution's introduction of the prior bad act evidence without effective Rule 
404(b) notice constitutes unfair surprise and severely impaired Adams' defense. In 
reliance on the prosecution's stated intention to introduce the prior conviction only in the 
event that he testifies, Adams prepared his defense as though the prior conviction would 
not be introduced and, therefore, he was not adequately prepared to address it. 
The harm to Adams by the introduction of the prior bad act evidence without 
notice was substantial in that it was introduced to prove intent, the primary issue at trial 
and the heart of Adams' defense. The State's case as to intent was merely circumstantial 
as no direct evidence of Adams' intent to kill existed. Thus, the introduction of the 
inadmissible evidence in the absence of notice was not harmless and constitutes 
reversible error. 
Next, under Rule 404(b), a party may present evidence of a defendant's prior bad 
acts if the evidence is admitted for a proper non-character purpose, and not to show 
propensity or proclivity. Also, evidence is admissible if it has special relevance to a 
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controverted or disputed issue in the case, and if it is more probative than prejudicial. 
The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of establishing its admissibility. 
In this case, the purported 404(b) evidence was not admissible for a proper non-
character purpose. Rather, it was admitted to show propensity and to cause Adams to be 
convicted based on unrelated conduct. Adams5 prior conviction was introduced by the 
State to prove intent, as intent was a pivotal issue at trial. However, the prior bad act 
evidence was probative of Adams' intent only insofar as it demonstrated that he had a 
propensity for violence and acted in accordance with that propensity. Because his intent 
could not be inferred without first inferring that Adams acted in conformity with a 
character trait or propensity, the inescapable conclusion is that the evidence was offered 
for a prohibited purpose. Further, the evidence was unduly prejudicial, and its 
admissibility resulted in reversible error. Adams respectfully asks this Court to reverse 
the trial court's ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PRIOR BAD ACT EVIDENCE WAS INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE THE 
PROSECUTION FAILED TO COMPLY WITH ITS RULE 404(b) NOTICE 
Rule 404(b)'s notice provision states that "upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or 
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial." Utah R. Evid. 404(b)1. Rule 404(b) pretrial 
1
 The consequence of a defective Rule 404(b) notice requirement is an issue that has yet 
to be addressed by Utah appellate courts. Given that Utah R. Evid. 404(b) is the same as 
Fed. R. Evid, 404(b), this brief looks to federal authority in addressing the absence of 
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notice is required only when the defense requests such advance notice. United States v. 
Aguilar, 59 Fed.Appx. 326, 329 (10th Cir. 2003). "If the government does not comply 
with the notice requirement of Rule 404(b) after a request by the accused, the offered 
evidence is inadmissible." United States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 83 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th 
Cir. 1996). 
A. The Prior Bad Act Evidence Was Inadmissible Because the State's Rule 
404(b) Notice Was Inoperable 
Pursuant to the Rule 404(b) notice provision, the defense requested that the State 
provide pretrial notice of "evidence of all other crimes, wrongs, or acts of any person, and 
the purposes of such evidence, the State intends to offer at trial, pursuant to Evidence 
Rule 404(b)" on August 15, 2008. R. 12. 
On June 10, 2009, the State filed its Notice of Intent to Offer Evidence Under Rule 
404(b) (hereinafter, "Rule 404(b) Notice") which stated its intention to introduce Adams' 
prior murder conviction "in the event that Defendant testifies at the trial and puts his 
knowledge or intent at issue." R. 40 (emphasis added). After a pre-trial argument on the 
issue, the trial court granted the State's motion allowing the prior conviction to be 
introduced. R. 85:8. 
At trial, the prosecution introduced Adams' prior conviction into evidence during 
its case-in-chief rather than "in the event that Defendant testifies" as contained in the 
notice. The Utah Supreme Court has held that M[a]lthough the Federal Rules of Evidence 
are a separate body of law from the Utah Rules of Evidence, if the reasoning of a federal 
case interpreting or applying a federal evidentiary rule is cogent and logical, we may 
freely look to that case, absent a Utah case directly on point, when we interpret or apply 
an analogous Utah evidentiary rule." See State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, *f 30 n. 1, 52 
P.3dll94. 
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Rule 404(b) Notice. R. 40. On direct examination, prosecution witness David Greco, 
stated that "[Adams] then mentioned that he had a previous incident back in 1995 where 
he had hit someone."2 R. 85:208. Defense counsel objected to the testimony stating, 
"Judge, I object to this. I think that the State has other methods of introducing this. This 
is hearsay." Id. The State's attorney responded to defense counsel's objection by 
claiming that the statement was a "statement against interest"3 and introduced State's 
Exhibit 5, the certified statement of conviction from Illinois. Id.; State's Exhibit 5. The 
trial court allowed the evidence telling defense counsel, "I'm going to overrule your 
The testimony of Detective Greco regarding the prior bad act was not a spontaneous 
statement of which the prosecution was unaware. In United States v. Kravchuk, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Rule 404(b)'s notice provision was not 
triggered by the spontaneous testimony of a witness where "the government did not know 
about the witness's testimony so as to warn the defendant, and therefore Rule 404(b)'s 
notice provision cannot apply." United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th 
Cir. 2003). Here, the State's Rule 404(b) Notice stated "Defendant, on October 4, 2008, 
informed Detective David Greco of West Valley Police department that, in 1995, he was 
convicted of Murder in Chicago for killing someone with a car." R. 40. Additionally, in 
arguing for admission of the purported 404(b) evidence at the inception of trial, the 
State's attorney said, "And the defendant already made a statement to Detective Greco 
from West Valley City who's going to testify today also that October is a bad month 
because fifteen years ago he was convicted of the same kind of crime ..." R. 85:5. 
Therefore, the Rule 404(b) notice provision had been triggered because the testimony of 
Detective Greco was not unforeseen by the prosecution. 
3
 The statement at issue was not a "statement against interest" pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3). 
A statement that Adams had a "previous incident back in 1995 where he hit someone" 
was not "so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by 
the declarant against another." Rule 804(b)(3). The statement did not have the potential 
to subject Adams to criminal liability. He had already been convicted and punished for 
the crime he committed in 1995. He served four years in prison for it. Thus, the 
statement did not qualify as a "statement against interest" exception to the hearsay rule. 
Moreover, the statement was not hearsay. Had it been relevant, the statement would have 
been admissible as non-hearsay as an admission by a party-opponent pursuant to Rule 
801(d)(2)(A). 
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objection. I've already told her that I will allow Exhibit 5. So it will be received." R. 
85:209. 
The fact that the original ruling on the purported 404(b) evidence allowed it to be 
introduced only in the event that Adams testified was disregarded by the State. By 
introducing the prior bad act evidence during its case-in-chief, regardless of whether or 
not Adams testified, the prosecution essentially rendered its Rule 404(b) notice 
inoperable. Defense counsel was notified that the prior act evidence would be introduced 
only if Adams testified. R. 40. Since he did not testify, the introduction of the evidence 
in contradiction of the prosecution's stated intention made the notice to Adams void. 
Because "'the notice requirement serves as condition precedent to admissibility of 404(b) 
evidence'" and Adams was not effectively notified, the prior bad act evidence was not 
admissible. United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Fed. R. 
Evid. 404(b), advisory committee note, 1991 amendment). 
B. The Introduction of the Prior Bad Act Evidence In the Absence of Notice 
Prejudiced Adams' Ability to Defend Himself 
"The policy behind the Rule 404(b) notice requirement is 'to reduce surprise and 
promote early resolution on the issue of admissibility.'" United States v. Carrasco, 381 
F.3d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), advisory committee 
note, 1991 amendment.) In Carrasco, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
the government's failure to provide proper 404(b) notice required reversal because the 
404(b) evidence that was introduced without the required 404(b) notice "went to the heart 
of [Defendant's] defense, his intent. The Government's failure to provide the required 
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Rule 404(b) notice therefore prejudiced [Defendant's] ability to defend himself." Id. at 
1241. 
Also, in Vega, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the 
government was entitled to introduce evidence of certain prior acts despite a lack of 
notice. Vega, 188 F.3d at 1152. There, the defendant made a pretrial request for all 
"other acts" evidence that the government intended to use at trial, and the government 
identified none. Id. Later, the government introduced, over the defendant's objection, 
evidence of prior bad acts. Id. at 1153-54. The Ninth Circuit held it was an abuse of 
discretion for the district court to admit the evidence in view of the government's failure 
to give the requisite notice. Id. at 1154-55. The Court found that the error was not 
harmless, reasoning that: 
The government's failure to give [Defendant] notice of the 404(b) evidence 
prejudiced [Defendant] in that her trial strategy could not adequately address 
other acts evidence since she did not know it would be introduced. 
[Defendant] was not able to investigate the other acts evidence that the 
government intended to use, nor could she prepare for cross examination of 
the rebuttal witnesses. Instead of giving [Defendant] notice, as required by 
Rule 404(b), the government lay in wait and sprung the 'other acts' evidence 
on her in its so-called rebuttal case. 
/rf. at 1155. 
In this case, Adams' was similarly prejudiced in his ability to defend himself due 
the lack of Rule 404(b) notice. Like in Vega, Adams was prejudiced by the absence of 
notice in that his trial strategy could not adequately address the prior conviction evidence 
since he did not know it would be introduced. Operating under the belief that the 404(b) 
evidence would not be introduced unless he took the stand, Adams was not prepared to 
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testify about the prior incident. He was not able to investigate the prior bad acts evidence 
that the prosecution intended to use, nor could he prepare his own witnesses to explain 
the prior acts. As in Carrasco, the lack of notice was especially harmful in light of the 
fact that the prior bad act evidence was offered by the prosecution to prove the most 
pivotal issue at trial, intent. 
Moreover, the prejudice to Adams' ability to defend himself was compounded by 
the false assurance that the prior conviction would not be introduced. The State's 
defective Rule 404(b) Notice was more detrimental than no notice at all because it 
effectively assured Adams that the prior conviction would not be introduced as long as he 
did not testify. The consideration of whether or not a witness's testimony runs the risk of 
"opening the door" to detrimental evidence is a major factor in determining whether or 
not that witness should testify at trial. The assurance by the State, that Adams' testimony 
was a condition precedent to the introduction of the prior conviction, therefore heavily 
influenced his defense strategy determinations and trial preparation. 
Because the prosecution introduced Adams' prior conviction during its case-in-
chief in opposition to its stated intention as contained in the Rule 404(b) notice, the notice 
to the defense was rendered void. Consequently, the prior bad act evidence was 
inadmissible pursuant to the Rule 404(b) notice provision. Allowing the inadmissible 
evidence to be introduced was an abuse of discretion that impaired Adams ability to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
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C. The Introduction of the Prior Bad Act Evidence In the Absence of Notice 
Constitutes Plain Error 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that f,[i]n analyzing errors, we are guided by 
the fundamental principle that all the rules relating to the conduct of criminal trials are 
meant to provide a fair, reasonable and practical means of doing justice. Where the error 
is one in which the fundamental fairness of the procedure by which the result is reached 
is drawn into question so as to cast doubt on the result, then reversal is warranted." State 
v. Lenaburg, 781 P.2d 432, 436-37 (Utah 1989) (internal citations omitted), abrogated on 
other grounds as stated in State v. Deporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). The plain error 
doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error occurred which prejudiced 
the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness prong may be relaxed when a 
highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in hindsight than it likely was 
before the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Eldredge, 112* P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, 
493 U.S. 814(1989). 
First, there can be no doubt that error was committed. The Utah Rules of Evidence 
are clear and unambiguous on this matter: "the prosecution in a criminal case shall 
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial ... of the nature of any such evidence it 
intends to introduce at trial." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). The evidence at issue here, Adams' 
prior conviction, was introduced by the prosecution in the absence of effective notice. 
Second, the error was obvious. The State's Rule 404(b) Notice explicitly stated that the 
prior bad act evidence would only be introduced "in the event that Defendant testifies at 
the trial and puts his knowledge or intent at issue." R. 40. Adams did not testify and the 
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prosecution nevertheless introduced the prior bad act evidence during its case-in-chief. 
R. 85:208. 
Finally, the harm caused by the error was substantial. Adams' ability to defend 
himself was severely impaired by the introduction of his prior conviction without notice. 
Had Adams been put on notice that the prior bad act evidence would be introduced, 
regardless of whether he testified, he would have had the opportunity to adequately 
address it in his defense strategy. Notably, Adams would have had the chance to prepare 
to distinguish the facts of the prior conviction from the facts of the present case through 
his own testimony or through additional witnesses. In reliance on the misleading 
representation of the State's Rule 404(b) Notice, Adams prepared his defense as if the 
prior conviction would not be introduced and, therefore, did not fully examine defense 
tactics that he may have otherwise pursued. 
Moreover, the inadmissible evidence was offered by the State to prove intent, the 
heart of Adams' defense. The issue of intent was central to the outcome of the trial, and 
no direct evidence existed that Adams harbored the requisite intent to kill when he hit 
Allan Saena with his car. The State's case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence 
and the prosecution witnesses gave conflicting accounts4 of the incident. Thus, absent 
4
 The prosecution alleged that Adams ran over Allan Saena twice and, therefore, intended 
to kill him. The State's attorney said, "And if ran over once, maybe is an accident. Ran 
over twice, your Honor, that's intent to kill." R. 85:230. The prosecution witnesses, 
however, gave conflicting testimony as to that fact. Gary Saena, who admitted to drinking 
three or four beers that night, and Jennifer Tafi testified that Adams hit Allan Saena 
twice. R. 85:30, 92,95. 
Ula Semeli also testified that Adams hit Allan Saena a second time. R. 85:116. 
However, Semeli, who had to be physically removed from the scene by police officers 
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the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that Adams would have received a more 
favorable outcome. 
Furthermore, the nature of the error involved in this case warrants a shift of the 
burden to the State to persuade this Court that the error was harmless. The harm 
determination in this case is analogous to that in State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 
1987), where the prosecution's evidentiary error impaired the defense and the record was 
silent as to how the outcome would be different if the error had not occurred. Id. at 914. 
In Knight, the prosecution failed to provide the defense with certain evidence prior to 
trial. Id. The Utah Supreme Court found that based on the nature of the error, it was 
difficult to determine from the record whether the defendant might have been able to 
(R. 85:195), also told Detective Greco that Adams swerved towards her, came around a 
third time trying to hit Allan Saena again, and then stopped, reversed his car and tried to 
hit him a fourth time. R. 85:217. Regarding Semeli's testimony, presiding Judge Barrett 
said, ".. .Ula, why she said what she said and why she got involved in telling a story that 
didn't make a whole lot of sense when she sat here in court and told a different story, and 
then couldn't remember what she told the detective, you know, that's too bad." R. 
85:248. 
The only uninterested party that witnessed Adams drive around the complex a 
second time testified that he did not see Adams' car hit anyone. R. 85:143. Prosecution 
witness, Mike Salisbury, the security guard on duty the night of the incident, was 
following Adams' when he allegedly ran over Allan Saena a second time. R. 85:143. 
Salisbury was following Adams' car at a distance of about three or four feet and testified 
that he did not see Adams' car run over anyone. R. 85:143, 148. Salisbury maintained 
that, as he drove past the spot where Allan Saena was allegedly run over for the second 
time, he was three or four feet behind Adams and there was no one in the road. R. 
85:150. 
Moreover, the testimony that the Adams hit Allan Saena a second time is also 
questionable because none of the witnesses who testified that Allan Saena was hit twice 
gave statements to the police the night of the incident. David Michael McPhie, the police 
officer who responded to the call, testified that, at the scene, the witnesses were 
uncooperative and very emotional. R. 85:191. Officer McPhie said, "[W]hen I attempted 
to speak to people, I obtained no viable statement from anybody. They were 
uncooperative." R. 85:193. 
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not breached its discovery obligations. Id. at 920. ihe Court explained mat: 
[V 'r]hen5 as here, the error consists of the prosecution's ftPuie to provide a 
defendant with inculpatory evidence, the record does not provide much 
assistance in discovering the nature or magnitude of the resulting prejudice 
to the defense. The record cannot reveal how knowledge of this evidence 
would have affected the actions of defense counsel, either in preparing for 
trial or in presenting the case to the jury. I'o a large extent, this leaves the 
reviewing court lo speculate whether, absent ihe error, there is a reasoj... \: 
likelihood that the deiense would ha\ e adduced other e\ idenee which, 
when considered in light of the evidence actual!) presented, w o.j\i have 
produced a rea*C'-'*H' -! ~:u~ *- 4 - <Lv defendant1 euih 
Id. at 920-21. Based on the difficulties associated with a silent record, the Court held that 
where the prosecutor's errors impaired ihe defense it would be appropriate "to place the 
ourue • V>J. liie Mate to persuade a court \h.\i me error did not unfairly prejudice the 
defer 
in Stale w Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988), the Court shifted the burden of 
persuasion to the State where the State "failed to meet the burden of notice imposed on it 
under the plain lamina nc of rule 4-;e! id. ai 10D. in making1: ••.:Jins^ jrror 
determination, the Court analogized to Knight and found that the record "cannot reveal 
how [adequate notice of the charges] w ould have affected the « ;^iwii., oi deiense counsel, 
either in nrenaring for trial oi in presei iting the case to t! le ji n > r ai id It lat the defendai it 
had made "a credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense." 
;u. ," i»> icitaiiwiis and quotations oniiUeu» i-ui iher. the Court held that "in assessing 
•
 h
-.
 l
--'
r
 the defer idai it's argi u. nei it of preji ldiciai impairi :i lent i ai lg si ifficiently !:i i le to 
' - • • ' . " • ' • 1 7 " ' ' • ' ' '• 
warrant shifting the burden of persuasion to the State, we would take into account the 
centrality of the matter affected by the prosecutor's errors." Id. (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
Here, as in Knight and Bell, the prosecutor's error in failing to provide effective 
Rule 404(b) notice plainly impaired the defense, and the record is similarly silent as to 
how the absence of the prosecutorial error would have affected the outcome of the trial. 
Further, the error involved the introduction of inadmissible evidence to prove the primary 
issue in the case, intent. Adams' defense to the State's case on the element of intent was 
"central to the outcome, and therefore, the error 'assumes heightened importance when 
evaluating whether the defense might have been impaired.'" Id. at 106-07 (quoting 
Knight, 734 P.2d at 921). Therefore, the burden should be placed on the prosecution to 
persuade the Court that its error in failing to satisfy the Rule 404(b) notice provision was 
harmless. 
II. ADAMS' PRIOR CONVICTION WAS INADMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO 
RULE 404(b) BECAUSE IT WAS NOT OFFERED FOR A PROPER NON-
CHARACTER PURPOSE AND IT WAS NOT RELEVANT TO A 
MATERIAL ISSUE 
That a person may be convicted criminally only for his acts and not for his general 
character is a fundamental principle of law. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, *f 15, 992 
P.2d 951. Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), which governs the admissibility of evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or bad acts, provides that: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
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opportunity, intent, pi epai atioi 1, plan, know ledge., idei itit) , or absence of 
mistake or -M.TSM ni .. 
Utah R. livid. 404. b). 
"
r
 K :(i:- >upi cnit Court has set forth a three-step process for determining 
uhrlliiT p> IOI hml u'l'« n iili'ii-1" is admissible. ' Stale v ttnidle\, 200.? I 11 App i IK, |^ 19 
57 P.3d 1139 (citingNelson-Waggoner, 200u U'l 59, at ffil 18-20) (footnote omitted). 
Under that process, the trial court must examine whether the e\ idencc i- *\! * ivle\ ant 
: v :; purpose, ^ e s not pose a 'danger o! uni.iir 
•"^iudicc" that 'substantia!H ---'veighs * • 'ah le " ! ' • f 
49, H 45. 1 01 P V ' " (oiling \M/<> i\ Widdison, 2001 UT 60, \ \ •, 28 P . J J 1278). 
bviaencL ...a. d\ ;cs not meet the requirements "is inadmissible and must be CXJ-J.* 1 " 
Vr,;A •'), . i- . >W HI V | "II i><> i |' M K U. - ' • ,"' .. 
. i . Adams' Prior Conviction Was Not \ d m [ s ^ i c h i A Pivpcr Non-character 
Purpose 
A prior conviction may not be used to show a defendant's propensity to commit 
n i'liin1 IIOWPVIT, ill may hi* .idniissiblc when1 nl lins ,l".i spt cuill in levinee lo a controverted 
issue and is introduced for a purpose other than to show the defendant's predisp- • . =:: o 
crijiJKuih;* ' ?!-*- - Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989), abrogated an other 
P.2d291,295^Llah LJOOJ). Under the first part ol 11 IH HMihi| aiiah sis Hie pn'poikiit 
must demonstrate (hat the evidence is actualh being offered for a proper, noncharacter 
. : iosespec : .. . . \ =i the rule. Siufc v. Wchster. 20011TT App ""Q 
* i i , 32 P.3d *•"< •-..••: 
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"when relevant to prove some material fact including absence of mistake or accident, 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity." State v. Shaffer, 
725 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Utah 1986). 
The purported 404(b) evidence in the instant case is Adams' 1995 conviction for 
murder in the state of Illinois. The State's Rule 404(b) Notice stated that Adams' prior 
conviction would be introduced "to establish knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake 
or accident..." R. 40. In arguing for admission based on the Rule 404(b) three-part test, 
the State's attorney said, 
The first step is if it was character evidence. In this case it's not. ... And I 
think in this case it's definitely probative in this case because, and this 
shows, and like the 404(b) indicator shows lack of accident, lack of 
mistake, shows almost every single one listed in 404(b), it basically says, 
T o prove the motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, planned knowledge, 
identity, and absence of mistake or accident.' 
R. 85:4-5. Rather than identifying the particular issue which the prior conviction was 
offered to prove, the prosecution read the list of issues for which prior bad acts can be 
admitted under Rule 404(b). However, "a proponent's incantation of the proper uses of 
[Rule 404(b) evidence] ... does not magically transform inadmissible evidence into 
admissible evidence." United States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Though the prosecution made reference to several purported grounds for admitting 
the evidence, the focus was primarily on intent and absence of mistake or accident. R. 
85:4-5. The State's attorney claimed that Adams' prior conviction was "relevant because 
the issue here we're trying to decide today is if the defendant intentionally ran over those 
two people." R. 85:4. Thus, under the State's theory, the evidence was admissible 
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Allan Saena with his car in 2008, some fourteen years later. But, upon close examination 
the only plausible theory for admission of Adams' prior conviction is to show the 
pi opensity to coi i in lit :i ime, ' 1 ii :1 i "1: . ; * evil dial Rule 404(b) seeks to prevent." 
Morley, 199 F.3d at 1 J 4 . 
Presumably, the State's theory for admission ofine evidence to prove intent relies 
on the proposition that the two acts were part of a common scheme or p*nn because, 
• : \ Y = * ' i r r " . i 
admission oi'ihe prior conviction to prove his intent. A common scheme or plan theory is 
meniic^s. nowcvr*r. because the two incidents were complete!}' unrelated. The prior 
: - .•*. urteen years. Aua;.^ .,^1 
moved from Illinois to Utah and apparently started ancM '•'. " • - : 
violent crime in '*-c intervening years, and no a showing of lack of opportunity since 
A.,- n\ pi, ^-w util. , .. :,,,. iiiivi xLiiing lourteen years, Two unrelated 
incidents occurrm*' foiirtren \rars iipjirl hi I In rrlln I a icne^ ot srqiicin r ml ail Um.itd 
the accomplishment of an overall objective. There is no evidence tying these acts together 
as part of some over-arching criminal scheme. "'In its effort to justify admission, the 
merely similar in nature with the more narrow common scheme or plan,'" Web * r '"*v'' 
TTT A,Pp 238 at * ^ (quoting Feutherson, 781 P.2d at 429). 
• *.•••• have no logical connection, Adams' prior conviction 
is inadmissible to show intent because the fact-fh idei i in ist i lecessarily I lse it for ai I 
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impermissible purpose, propensity, before it can reflect on a permissible purpose, intent. 
"Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) only if it is relevant for a permissible purpose 
and that relevance does not depend on a defendant likely acting in conformity with an 
alleged character trait." United States v. Commanche, 577 F.3d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 
2009)5. "[W]hen evidence of prior bad acts is offered, the proponent must clearly 
articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which may 
be the inference that the defendant has the propensity to commit the crime charged" 
United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir.1994) (emphasis added). 
Since Adams' prior conviction bears on his intent in the instant case only insofar 
as the fact-finder first determines that he has a propensity for violence, the district court 
abused its discretion in ruling that it was admissible. "[Pjroof offered [of other bad acts] 
is not saved from the principle of exclusion by the mere fact that it supports a specific 
inference to a point like intent if the necessary logical steps include an inference of 
general character or propensity ...." Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 
Federal Evidence § 4:28, at 746-47 (3d ed. 2007). Moreover, "where the charge requires 
the prosecution prove a specific intent of the defendant to commit the specific crime 
charged, a prior unconnected similar act proves no more than a general intent. A general 
intent is propensity or character evidence, demonstrably different from evidence showing 
5
 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that n[S]ince the advisory committee generally 
sought to achieve uniformity between Utah's rules and the federal rules, [the Utah 
Supreme Court] looks to the interpretations of the federal rules by the federal courts to 
aid in interpreting the Utah rules." State v. Gray, 111 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986). 
Accordingly, this brief looks to federal law interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
to aid in the interpretation of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), 
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the Presumption of Guilt and Innocence: Ruies 4(JJ:h i ' A ' " ' .nJ 60^ • s^' \ •. . 
135. 1^ 8 (1989) (footnote omitted) (discussing Federal Rule «>i h'vidcncc 404(b;) 
. - . . , . : . . : , ; • • • > • r " ] . 
The State's claim that the prioi con v iction w as ii iti odi IC = :I to si 1 : * • Adan is5 
specific intent to commit murder fails because an incident that occurred fourteen years 
ea;n^ in ..Jkiher state undci unknown circumstances had no bearing on Adams' *>tate wf 
at an apartment building in Sail Luke Cuj. iv. i>j.L±. ihc parties in\ »*K - * -• • 
incident have no logical connection to the parties in\ ohcu in \h. " ri---i incident -ince 
nrithsT Allan Sikii.i inn i nil") Sacna Imtl e\ei met Adams prior lu October 6, 200K, R 
85:78 
The State must rely on the prohibited purpose of propensity for the prior 
conviction to be relevant to Adams' intent in this case. The following excerpt from. 
'('onminifalor Onlos ","»• is ivle\ anl t" this poml: • ;- . • •• 
Hie conclusion that the defendant intended to commit this particular crime • •' 
is the end product of a chain of inferences. It proceeds from the given 
proposition that the defendant at another place and time committed a criri le 
similar to, but unconnected with, the present crime. From the proven fact -
the "prior" - we are asked to infer that on a specific day and time this 
defendant had the specific intent to participate in the crime charged. Hie 
conclusion and its factual basis are widely separated. The gap can be 
bridged only by supplying an inference that the defendant has a tendency 
(that is, a propensity) to comniii ihN k'nu jf crime. It is this inference that 
is not permissible. 
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Ordover at 158; see also Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: 
America, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 988, 1032-33 (1938) (condemning this sort of reasoning as a 
perversion of the bad-acts evidence rule and stating that "[t]he broad rule, which seemed 
to give greater protection to the accused, has produced a rule depriving him of every 
shred of protection"). 
Furthermore, since intent is an element of virtually every crime, the intent 
exception to Rule 404(b) would swallow the rule if it always allowed the admission of 
prior bad acts simply to prove the intent element of the offense on trial. See Thompson v. 
United States, 546 A.2d 414, 420-21 (D.C.1988) ("[T]he intent exception has the 
capacity to emasculate the other crimes rule. This is so because, in many cases, it is 
difficult or impossible to differentiate between the intent to do an act and the 
predisposition to do it. For obvious reasons, therefore, courts must be vigilant to ensure 
that poisonous predisposition evidence is not brought before the jury in more attractive 
wrapping and under a more enticing sobriquet." (citations omitted)). A differentiation 
must be made between prior crime evidence that is independent of a propensity purpose 
and prior crime evidence that impermissibly relies on propensity. 
In Commanche, the Tenth Circuit explained that "[i]n some instances, the 
permissible purposes of 404(b) evidence are logically independent from the 
impermissible purpose of demonstrating conformity with a character trait." Commanche, 
511 F.3d at 1266 (emphasis in original). As an example of this proposition, the Court 
cited United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2001), where a defendant's prior 
drunk driving convictions were admissible to show malice in that the defendant had 
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convictions were relevant to demonstrate malice without first requiring ' . : » 
conclude that the defendant acted in conformity with an alleged character trait." 
Commanche, 577 F.3d at 1266 \ Ithoi igh, the defendant's propensity n>i uri\ mg Uiunk • 
may be inferred from the prior convictioi is tl le proper i 1 : n character pi it pose of sho i- v ii ig 
malice is logicallx independent
 (»Mhal character trait. •.•;•' . 
In explaining tne alternative proposition,, applicable to the instant c;i>.e, A1 ere the 
hud iirt ovidniu IUMI , m i piTmissibh |UH'|HIM-oiih i f l ln * * * .J<*. .. .^ 
the defendant likely acted in conformity with a particular character trait, the Tenth ('lrruit 
used ihc i.'!lowing hypothetical situation: 
Consider a case in which a defendant is accused ui mi;. - . .g ins \\ nc 
using his car but claims that he thought that car was in iv v erse when it ^ s 
actually in drive. To demonstrate the absence of mistake, the government 
attempts to elicit testimony that the defendant twice previously slapped his 
wife. In such a case, the disparate circumstances between the prior 
instances and the vehicular killing negate any possibility of directly using 
the prior instances to show lack of mistake. Rather, a jur> could use this 
evidence to conclude that the defendant was not mistaken as to the status of 
his transmission only if it first concluded that he had a propensity for 
violence against his wife and this alleged murder was another such inud= 
Rule 404(b) does not allow evidence of other bad acts in such a case. If i; u 
defendant is to be convicted of murder, it must be based on his allegedly 
murderous act and not his bad character. . 
h I i t:l 1266-67 ' •' . • . -. - . • - ... ; • ' • . ' . ' ;. . . '• . ' • ' " • \ • 
Similarly, in this case, the State's assertion that the prior con\ iction is rele "v ant t : • 
\dains' intent to O'Msmi! n iir.ler requires the fact-finder - draw an intermediate 
•!^Ti,:,c'1N:;'.-. : •-• .; s - ' - i -» ^ ,,vU i iv * u • u »>* m ?. parties ar inten* The charged 
offense occurred m < K\ ^. • - ' j v " « > - '• > • * J 
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fourteen years earlier in Chicago. To bridge the temporal and spatial gap between the two 
incidents, the State must assume Adams' propensity to entertain the same intent in similar 
situations. That assumption is the inescapable link between the charged offense and the 
prior conviction. The trier of fact can reason from the starting point of the prior 
conviction to a conclusion about the mens rea of the charged crime only through an 
intermediate assumption about Adams' character or propensity. 
"Where evidence of prior crimes can become probative with respect to intent only 
after an inference of predisposition has been drawn, the argument for admission is at its 
weakest, for the distinction between intent and predisposition then becomes ephemeral." 
Thompson, 546 A.2d at 421. Since Adams' prior conviction is not probative of his intent 
or absence of mistake without first inferring that he acted in conformity with a particular 
character trait, the prior conviction was not admissible for a proper non-character 
purpose. 
The prior conviction had no probative value beyond the prohibited inference that 
Adam had a propensity to commit such crimes and acted in accordance with that 
propensity. Any uncertainty as to the State's actual purpose for introducing the statement 
was dispelled during its argument for admission. The prosecutor expressly declared that, 
"[I]t is relevant because the issue here we're trying to decide today is if the defendant 
intentionally ran over those two people. And so that does go directly into the issue here 
for this prior conviction because that's what he did back in 1995 and '94" R. 85:4 
(emphasis added). This further demonstrates that the State's purpose in introducing the 
prior conviction was to show that, since Adams was convicted of intentionally killing a 
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per"" i Iniiiieen * cars earhei in !i!"i\f li,i\ c had Ihe intent to Is ill Mian Saena in this case, 
This is precisely the propensity purpose that 4041bI pro-.* lihes. 
TV Adams" Prior Conviction Was Not Relevant To A Material Issue 
\ dencc admitted lor ,i \ alid purpose must pass rule 402 which 
provides, -n periuiuit part, that "|e|\ idem r \s hull i\ iinl irlev -nil i". imf admivjhk ** I i| ill 
R, Evid. 402; see Decorso, I1)1)1) UT 5 7 at J 20. Relevant evidence is "'evidence having 
any Icndency to make the existence of any fact that h of consequence le ihe 
dele* t ; re I" , . . ; * . . . . * \ - u m l»c \v i i i iuu i !;.K 
exidence/ ' Utah R. Evid. 401 . In State v, Johnson, /48 4i \\ !'*' "• : ' : • ,h 
Supreme Court stated that "[t]o give meaning to the policy embodied in K u k au4^h), ... 
I udenue nfnih " • ••'""" •?«"!*'" »»e reasonably necessary and highly probative of a material 
issue." Johnson, 748 P.2d ef 
~he Prior Bad Act Evidence Has No Logical Connection w f' 
Instant Case 
Adams' com i ,1 ini n fourteen years earlier for an unrelated crime does not make: the 
existence of his intent to kill m flip, rase more pioh.ihlr -1 less probable I 'tali l(, K id. 
*") \ dams' 1995 ee>m iciion has no relevance to his state of mind the night of the crime 
- •!,. As or :>ed, the prior incident happened more than fourteen 
years earlier in another stale and im lib i d minielalcil pjrtn ^ Wiin^ l{){)^ com
 : uioh ior 
i nurder shows only that he killed a person fifteen years ago in (Tiieapo I lnless me pi H n 
conviction is used to show propensity; it does not p n ^ e th il Adams intentionally or 
]
- : A ... -• vju.- iinn ;.tUi u u s "evidence is irrelevant and 
inadmissible under rule 402 if the evidence is material and relevant to prove only the 
defendant's proclivity to commit the crime charged." Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67 at If 32 
(citing Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at ^26). 
2. The Prior Conviction Is Too Remote To Be Relevant 
Adams' prior conviction is too remote to be relevant to the instant case. Where the 
prior acts "were too remote in time to the crime charged" evidence of prior bad acts lacks 
probative value for the proposed non-character purpose should not be admitted. State v. 
Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Prior acts may be relevant to the offense 
charged when they are sufficiently "similar to the charged conduct" and "close enough in 
time" to the charged conduct. State v. Rees, 2004 UT App 51,1f 11, 88 P.3d 359 (Thome, 
J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 at [^33 (noting that 
proximity of time is a significant factor when a court decides whether to admit prior bad 
act evidence). "Remoteness refers to the time between the prior crime and the offense for 
which the accused is on trial." Featherson, 781 P.2d at 430 (citation omitted) {partially 
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Deporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997)). However, 
"the test for remoteness is not a mechanical application." Id. "The relevant inquiry is 
whether the other acts have 'clearly probative value with respect to the intent of the 
accused at the time of the offense charged'" United States v. Scott, 701 F.2d 1340, 1345-
46 (11th Cir.), rehfg denied, 707 F.2d 523 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 856 (1983) 
(quoting United States v. San Martin, 505 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1974)) (emphasis in 
original). 
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along with the fact that it was entirely unrelated to the incident that is subject of the 
present case, demonstrate that it is not relevant. Absent an inference to Adams' 
propensity, the prior conviction is too remote to make the existence of his intent to kill 
Allan Saena more probable. Adams prior conviction was, therefore, inadmissible because 
"[u]nless the other crimes evidence tends to prove some fact that is material to the crime 
charged - other than the defendant's propensity to commit crime - it is irrelevant and 
should be excluded by the court pursuant to rule 402." Decor so, 1999 UT 57 at \ 22. 
3. There Was Insufficient Information About the Prior Incident to 
Determine Relevancy 
Even if the prior act had been more recent, the State foiled to provide enough 
details about the prior incident that would allow a trier of fact to justify a conclusion that 
it was relevant. As the proponent, the State was required to "'articulate precisely the 
evidentiary hypothesis by which a fact of consequence may be inferred from the evidence 
of other acts'" and the '"trial court must specifically identify the purpose for which such 
evidence is offered and a broad statement merely invoking or restating Rule 404(b) will 
not suffice.'" United States v. Larson, No. 2:04-CR-643TS, 2006 WL 1348183, 1 (D. 
Utah, 2006. May 12, 2006) (quoting United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (10th 
Cir.1985)). 
Here, the State provided almost no substantive facts regarding the prior incident to 
rationalize relevancy on the issue of intent. The State introduced a certified statement of 
conviction showing the fact that Adams was convicted of murder in 1995. R. 85:208-9; 
State Exhibit 5. With regard to the particular facts surrounding the 1995 conviction, the 
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pi osecution stated only tl lat, " he 1 lit soi nebody v v ith a car and ;K. Mik a that person in 
Chicago and because those people arc coining ailei linn I hose f»*iiui members weir 
coming after him..." R Sc k in sum. at ihc lime of the trial court's ruling on the evidence, 
u.i.i ^ ' ;•• - "M
 ;- - •. <i murdering someone with a car fourteen years 
earlier in Chicago, and thai hi ; * '. - J * * . ;._• mng 
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regarding the prior incident, "the trial court's ruling on this issue withoir •» •-.•he 
ii ifbrmation regarding the prior bad... act does not qualify as the type of "scrupulous 
2001 UTApp at Tf 37. (citations omitted). 
The district ..»JH -herefore, erred in ruling Adams' prior conviction admissible, 
in i onls because n is iminutji;. • u,„ I^LK, oi intent and too remote to be probative to 
this case, but also because there was not adequate information provided about the prior 
incident to properly determine that it was relevant to proper non-character purpose. 
C. The Probative Value of the Prior Bad Act Evidence Is Substantially 
Outweighed By the Danger of Unfair Prejudice 
Any relevant prior bad acts evidence admitted for a non-character purpose must 
pass rule 403, which provides that "[although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. 
Evidence of prior criminal activity is presumed prejudicial because of "the 
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused because of bad character rather than 
because he is shown to be guilty of the offenses charged." State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 
738, 741 (Utah 1985), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 
489 (Utah 1997). The Court in Doporto expressly recognized a presumption against 
admissibility of testimony regarding past criminal history: 
For the reasons stated by Dean Wigmore, the prejudice that can flow from 
admitting evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant can be 
unusually prejudicial, raising acute concerns of fundamental fairness 
arising from the real possibility that the defendant will be convicted for his 
presumed bad character rather than his acts. 
Doporto, 935 P.2d at 489 (citing 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 58.2, at 1212 (Tillers rev. ed. 
1983)). 
When weighing the probative value of evidence against its potentially prejudicial 
effects, Utah courts consider a variety of factors, including, 
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(1) the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, (2) 
the similarities between the crimes, (3) the interval of time that has elapsed 
between the crimes, (4) the need for the evidence, (5) the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and (6) the degree to which the evidence probably will 
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. 
State v. Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, H 44, 219 P.3d 75 (citing State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 
291, 295-6 (Utah 1995) (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 565 (3d 
ed. 1984)); see also Utah R. Evid. 403. 
The first factor, which concerns uthe strength of the evidence as to the commission 
of the other crime," is not at issue here. See Marchet, 2009 UT App 262 at ^ 44. The 
purported 404(b) evidence in this case is a prior conviction. Thus, the strength of the 
evidence of as to the commission of the prior crime can be assumed. 
The second factor concerns the similarities between the charged crime and the 
prior acts. Id. In this case, the known similarities between the two incidents are minor 
and fail to establish how the prior conviction is probative of intent. Both incidents 
involve Adams hitting a person with a car causing serious or fatal injury. Also, based on 
the prosecutor's statement, both incidents involve "people coming after [Adams]." R. 
85:5. But the proposition that Adams harbored the requisite intent to kill in this case 
based on these limited similarities constitutes propensity and is improper as a matter of 
law. In a comparable case, the prosecution argued for the admission of prior bad act 
evidence on the basis that "defendant's pattern of striking back at those who angered him 
and his use of juveniles to commit crimes demonstrate [d] a distinct strategy." State v. 
Hughes, 938 P.2d 457, 464 (Ariz. 1997). The court was not persuaded, finding that the 
prosecution's argument was "merely another way of saying that the defendant acted 
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inconformity with his prior bad acts, the very essence of what Rule 404(b) forbids." Id. 
Likewise, the inference that Adams intended to kill Allan Saena because he was involved 
in a vaguely similar incident fourteen years earlier is precisely what is proscribed by Rule 
404(b). 
The third factor concerns timing. See Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, \ 44. As 
previously discussed, the great interval of time between Adams' prior conviction and the 
present case further supports the conclusion that the prior conviction has no probative 
value to any proper non-character purpose. The prior conviction is far too remote to be 
relevant here. 
The fourth and fifth factors are related. They consider the need for evidence and 
the efficacy of alternative proof. Id. Here, other than the prohibited purpose of showing 
that Adams has a propensity commit murder, Adams' prior conviction has no evidentiary 
value. Therefore, the prior conviction evidence was wholly unnecessary. 
The final factor that courts consider when weighing the probative value of 
evidence against its potentially prejudicial effects is "'the degree to which the evidence 
probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.'" Id. (citations omitted). Here, 
the trier of fact was the judge rather than a jury and "the judge in a bench trial,... acting 
as a trier of fact, is presumably less likely than a jury to be prejudiced by evidence of 
prior crimes, wrongs, or acts." State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orern, 942 
P.2d 925, 930 (Utah 1997), cert, denied, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000) (quoting Featherson, 781 
P.2dat431). 
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However, the highly prejudicial effect of a prior murder conviction to a defendant 
on trial for attempted murder is undeniable. The references to Adams' prior conviction 
during the trial and the closing arguments would affect even the most careful trier of fact. 
"The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribuml-whether judge or jury As to give 
excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited and either to allow it to 
bear too strongly on the present charge or to take the proof of it as justifying a 
condemnation, irrespective of the accused's guilt of the present charge." Wigmore, supra, 
§58.2, at 1212. 
Furthermore, the proposition that a trial court can never be prejudiced by prior bad 
act evidence, in spite of its ruling the evidence admissible, undercuts the primary 
operative effect of Rule 404(b) and opens the door to virtually any prior bad act evidence, 
without regard for rules of evidence designed to insure a verdict based on the allegations 
of the crime charged and not the character of the accused. Given that the prior bad act 
evidence had no relevance to the instant case whatsoever, its potential prejudicial effect 
greatly outweighs it probative value. 
D. The Admission of Adams' Prior Conviction Constitutes Reversible Error 
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated the prejudice standard for evidentiary 
error as follows: "If, in the absence of the evidentiary errors, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for defendant, we must reverse the conviction." 
State v. RimmascK 775 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989); State v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 
1122 (Utah 1989) (in assessing harm, the court will not apply the sufficiency-of-the-
evidence standard, "rather, it focuses on the taint caused by the error"). Harm sufficient to 
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require reversal occurs unless "it is 'sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is 
no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of proceedings.'" See, e.g., 
State v. RhineharU 2006 UT App 517, If 28, 153 P.3d 830 (quoting State v. Loose, 2000 
UT 114 10 n.l, 994 P.2d 1237). If the "taint" caused by inadmissible evidence is 
sufficient, "it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to support a verdict." 
MzYc/ze//,779P.2datll22. 
Here, the harmful consequences of admitting Adams' prior conviction raise a 
reasonable likelihood that he would have received a more favorable outcome in the 
absence of the error. Most notably, if the trial court had ruled the evidence inadmissible, 
the prior conviction would not have been considered in Adams' guilt determination. 
Although "[t]he court, sitting without a jury, is presumed to have disregarded any 
irrelevant, immaterial or other evidence not pertinent to the issue," State v. Burke, 129 
P.2d 560 (1942), the trial court's ruling in this case demonstrates that it considered 
Adams' prior conviction to be competent and had no reason to discount it in determining 
his guilt. Specifically, the court's ruling manifests an assertion that the prior conviction 
evidence was relevant to prove that Adams' harbored an intent to kill. 
While it is generally presumed that a trial court only considers competent 
evidence, other jurisdictions have held the presumption rebuttable where the record 
demonstrates otherwise. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that "[w]here an objection 
has been made to the evidence and overruled, it cannot be presumed that the evidence did 
not enter into the court's consideration. The ruling itself indicates that the court thought 
the evidence proper." People v. Naylor, 893 N.E.2d 653, 666 (111. 2008) (citations 
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omitted). Similarly, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts has held that "If the improper 
evidence is admitted before a judge, sitting without a jury, and if the judge does not 
indicate whether he or she has considered the improperly admitted evidence ... [w]e can 
only speculate upon the effect of that evidence. [When w]e are not in a position to say 
that it had none ... such doubts as we entertain can only be resolved in favor of the 
defendant." Commonwealth v. Darby, 642 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) 
(citations omitted). 
In another case, where the trial court permitted, over the defendant's objection, 
testimony of a police officer that referred to a previous conviction of the defendant, the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas found prejudicial error. Hickey v. State, 569 S.W.2d 64 
(1978). The court rejected the argument that a trial before a judge, sitting as a jury, 
should be treated differently from a case tried to a jury, stating "We submit that because a 
case is tried before a trial judge without the aid and assistance of a jury, this does not, in 
the least, reduce the proceedings to an informal setting where the principles of law and 
justice are disregarded or perverted." Id. at 66. 
In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the United States Supreme 
Court found a codefendant's statements incompetent to corroborate a defendant's 
admission. Id. at 492. At trial, defense counsel had objected to introduction of the 
codefendant's statement on the ground that it would not be binding on the defendant, but 
the trial judge, who tried the case without a jury, nevertheless allowed statement to come 
in. The Court found that the admission of the inadmissible statement required reversal, 
"The trial judge, in allowing the statements in, apparently overruled all of petitioners' 
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objections, including this one. Thus we presume that he considered all portions of both 
statements as hearing upon the guilt of both petitioners." Id. The Court reasoned that 
"because he might, as the factfinder, have found insufficient corroboration from the 
narcotics alone, we cannot be sure that the scales were not tipped in favor of conviction 
by reliance upon the inadmissible [co-defendant] statement." Id. at 493. 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has dispensed with the presumption all 
together, holding that when inadmissible evidence is admitted in a trial to the judge, 
courts of appeal, in determining whether to reverse a conviction, may no longer presume 
that the judge disregarded the inadmissible evidence. See Gipson v. State, 844 S.W.2d 
738, 741 (Tex. Crim. App.1992). The court found the presumption to be in conflict with 
a Texas rule of appellate procedure6 which requires reversal "when error is found in the 
proceedings below unless [the appellate court is] able to analyze the error and its effects 
and determine beyond a reasonable doubt that error made no contribution to the 
conviction or punishment." Id. at 741 (emphasis in original). The Court explained that 
"[e]ach case must be examined on its own merits by the appellate court, and if the record 
does not expressly show .... that the error complained of clearly contributed to the 
conviction, then the error must undergo an in-depth analysis for harm to the defendant." 
Id. 
6
 The Texas rule states: "If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the 
proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless 
the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no 
contribution to the conviction or to the punishment." Texas App. Proc, Rule 81(b)(2). 
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In the present case, the trial court's ruling on the purported 404(b) evidence 
demonstrates that the prior conviction was considered in Adams' guilt determination. As 
previously discussed, the law has long prohibited the admission of prior crime evidence 
unless the proffered evidence "has 'a special relevance to a controverted issue and is 
introduced for a purpose other than to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality.' 
" Feather son, 781 P.2d at 426 (quoting Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295); see also Fedorowicz, 
2002 UT 67 at ^ 26. Thus, it must be assumed that the trial court considered Adams' 
previous conviction relevant and probative of whether Adams harbored the requisite 
intent to kill when he hit Allan Saena with his car. Otherwise, the trial court would not 
have ruled the prior bad act evidence admissible. "The rules as to admissibility of 
evidence are the same whether the trial be had with or without a jury." People v. Borrelli, 
64 N.E.2d 719, 724 (111. 1946) (quoting People v. Arendarczyk, 12 N.E.2d 2 (111. 1937)). 
Moreover, by ruling Adams' prior conviction admissible over defense counsel's 
objections, the trial court further demonstrated the assertion that the prior bad act 
evidence was properly being offered to prove Adams' intent to kill. Defense counsel 
argued that Adams' prior conviction was improperly being offered to show character. R. 
85:6. And, defense counsel maintained that Adams' statement to Detective Greco could 
not be relevant of Adams' intent when he hit Allan Saena, stating "... there's nothing in 
his statement to the officer that he saw these people and thought he had to hit them, 
thought he should run them over to save his life. There's nothing of that." Id. In spite of 
defense counsel's arguments, the trial court ruled the prior conviction admissible. Id. at 8. 
In doing so, the trial court assumed the position that the evidence was offered for a proper 
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non-character purpose and was relevant to the issue of intent, the primary issue at trial. 
Therefore, there is reasonable likelihood that Adams would have received a more 
favorable outcome had the prior bad act not been erroneously introduced. 
In addition, had the prior conviction been ruled inadmissible, it would not have 
been erroneously introduced by the prosecution without proper Rule 404(b) notice. The 
trial court improperly allowed the evidence during the prosecution's case-in-chief, telling 
defense counsel, "I'm going to overrule your objection. I've already told her that I will 
allow Exhibit 5. So it will be received." R. 85:209. As discussed herein, the introduction 
of the evidence without proper 404(b) notice constituted unfair surprise and severely 
hindered Adams' defense strategy. 
A ruling that the prior bad act was inadmissible would have also prevented the 
prosecution from repeatedly mentioning the prior murder during the trial. The prejudicial 
effect of a prior murder conviction on a person standing trial for attempted murder is 
considerable. In addition to introducing the incompetent evidence during its case-in-
chief, the prosecution also referred to Adams' prior conviction during closing argument. 
In closing argument, the State's attorney said, "And with the fact that he was convicted of 
killing some guy by car in Chicago 15 years ago, 14 years ago, car is just the preferred 
weapon of the man." R. 85: 231. The prejudicial effect of such a statement lies in the fact 
that it infers to the court that Adams is guilty because he has a propensity for killing 
people with cars. The court's error in allowing the prior bad act evidence was 
compounded by the prosecution's urging to convict on that basis. A ruling that the 
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evidence was inadmissible would have minimized its prejudicial effect by precluding the 
prosecution's repeated references to the prior conviction. 
In sum, if ruled inadmissible, the prior conviction would not have been referenced 
in the State's closing arguments or improperly introduced in violation of the Rule 404(b) 
notice provision. And, had prior conviction been deemed inadmissible pursuant to Rule 
404(b), it would not have been substantively considered in Adams' guilt determination. 
Given that intent was the central issue in this case and the prior bad act evidence 
was deemed admissible to prove intent, the outcome of the trial would likely have been 
different if the court had not considered the evidence. The evidence in this case was 
close. No direct evidence existed that Adams harbored the requisite intent to kill when he 
hit Allan Saena with his car. The State's case was based entirely on circumstantial 
evidence and, as previously discussed, the prosecution witnesses gave conflicting 
accounts of the incident. Supra, n.4. Thus, absent the erroneously admitted evidence, the 
likelihood of a different outcome is "sufficiently high to undermine the confidence" in 
Adams' conviction. Knight, 734 P.2d. at 920 (Utah 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Adams respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JO^day of April, 2010. ^ 
S l g ^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VERBERY ADAMS, 
Defendant. 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 081907684 FS 
Judge: WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Date: August 24, 2 009 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cyndiac 
Prosecutor: M. ROSE FOR C. COLLINS 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MACK, DAVID P. S 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 7, 1959 
Video 
Tape Number: CR W39 Tape Count: 10:16-10:23 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED MURDER - 1st Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 06/25/2009 Guilty 
HEARING 
TAPE: CR W39 COUNT: 10:16 
Defense counsel advises the court that there is one additional 
mistake in the Pre-Sentence Report that needs to be corrected. 
AP&P will make the correction and provide defense counsel with the 
corrected report. 
The parties agree to go forward with sentencing. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED MURDER a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than three years and which may be life in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Case No: 081907684 
Date: Aug 24, 2009 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The court recommends the defendant receive credit for time served. 
TabB 
UTAH R. EVID. 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
UTAH R. EVID. 404 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
(a)(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of 
the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the 
prosecution; 
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases. 
(c)(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation, 
evidence of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible to prove 
a propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
(c)(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in 
relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be a sexual 
offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense. 
(c)(3) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissible 
under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. Rule 404(a)-(b) is now Federal Rule of Evidence 404 
verbatim. The 2001 amendments add the notice provisions already in the federal rule, add 
the amendments made to the federal rule effective December 1, 2000, and delete 
language added to the Utah Rule 404(b) in 1998. However, the deletion of that language 
is not intended to reinstate the holding of State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). 
Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b) must also conform with Rules 402 and 
403 to be admissible. 
The 2008 amendment adds Rule 404(c). It applies in criminal cases where the accused 
is charged with a sexual offense against a child under the age of 14. Before evidence may 
be admitted under Rule 404(c), the trial court should conduct a hearing out of the 
presence of the jury to determine: (1) whether the accused committed other acts, which if 
committed in this State would constitute a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a 
sexual offense; (2) whether the evidence of other acts tends to prove the accused's 
propensity to commit the crime charged; and (3) whether under Rule 403 the danger of 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence, or whether 
for other reasons listed in Rule 403 the evidence should not be admitted. The court should 
consider the factors applicable as set forth in State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 
(Utah 1988), which also may be applicable in determinations under Rule 404(b). 
Upon the request of a party, the court may be required to provide a limiting 
instruction for evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) or (c). 
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